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Creativity is commonly thought of as a positive advance for society that transcends the
status quo knowledge. Humans display an inordinate capacity for it in a broad range of
activities, with art being only one. Most work on creativity’s neural substrates measures
general creativity, and that is done with laboratory tasks, whereas specific creativity in
art is gleaned from acquired brain damage, largely in observing established visual artists,
and some in visual de novo artists (became artists after the damage). The verb “to
create” has been erroneously equated with creativity; creativity, in the classic sense, does
not appear to be enhanced following brain damage, regardless of etiology. The turning
to communication through art in lieu of language deficits reflects a biological survival
strategy. Creativity in art, and in other domains, is most likely dependent on intact and
healthy knowledge and semantic conceptual systems, which are represented in several
pathways in the cortex. It is adversely affected when these systems are dysfunctional, for
congenital reasons (savant autism) or because of acquired brain damage (stroke, dementia,
Parkinson’s), whereas inherent artistic talent and skill appear less affected. Clues to the
neural substrates of general creativity and specific art creativity can be gleaned from
considering that art is produced spontaneously mainly by humans, that there are unique
neuroanatomical and neurofunctional organizations in the human brain, and that there are
biological antecedents of innovation in animals.
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INTRODUCTION
Creativity is enormously adaptive for individuals and society.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any human progress without this
capacity. It is commonly defined as the introduction of some-
thing innovatively new and positive for society that goes beyond
the familiar and accepted (Zaidel, 2013b). The key to the pos-
itive feature is the social aspect, namely recognition by others
and adoption as the new status quo (Hodder, 1998; Simonton,
2003). Evolution appears to favor the positive social aspects
of creativity (Byrne, 1998; Mithen, 1998). Bio-social pressures
are thought to have shaped the evolution of the human brain,
including its size and neuroanatomical and neurofunctional con-
figurations (e.g., Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). Art is a symbolic
communicative system practiced only by humans, and argued
to have become a fully practiced behavior at a time when early
human social groups grew in size and complexity, and com-
munication through language and art promoted cohesion and
survival.
Art is but one example where humans demonstrate the capac-
ity for creativity. We observe it in science, engineering, technol-
ogy, business, education, and countless other domains. However,
most research on the brain’s underpinning of creativity applies
to general creativity. It is typically measured with laboratory-
constructed tasks, not specifically with art production. But most
of the findings from general creativity could apply to art as well.
Conversely, since art is produced spontaneously only by humans
and is ubiquitously present in human societies, gaining insight
into creativity through art can help understand the neural under-
pinning of general creativity (Creativity is a noun, as opposed
to the verb “to create”, as in to produce; a produced artwork
does not necessarily meet the criteria of creativity). There is enor-
mous variability in the capacity for creativity, some individuals
are hardly creative at all and others are exceptionally creative.
The neural underpinning of the creativity of Newton, Einstein,
Monet, Cezanne, Chagall, and Picasso, for example, remains little
understood (Boden, 2013), although we have gained important
insights from the study, discussion, and exploration of their
behavior, life-style, and thinking (Gardner, 1994a; Miller, 2000,
2002).
The fact that humans display inordinate capacity for creativity
likely reflects the unique neurological organization of the human
brain (Allman, 2000; Preuss, 2011; van Essen et al., 2012; Buckner
and Krienen, 2013), the cognition afforded by it (Mantini et al.,
2013), the biological antecedents of innovation evidenced in
animals (Laland and Reader, 2010; Kaufman et al., 2011), bio-
cultural practices (Bartlett, 1928; Hagman, 2005; Kim et al.,
2013), and selective evolutionary pressures (Mithen, 1998). What
in the brain triggers the moment of “rising above” established
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knowledge, and why are some individuals exceptionally creative,
are questions that are still being explored (Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2011; Barbey et al., 2013; Jung and Haier, 2013). At the same
time, several creativity-related factors have already been iden-
tified, specifically brain size in innovative animals (Reader and
Laland, 2002; Lefebvre et al., 2004), neurotransmitters (Manzano
et al., 2010), intelligence level (Sternberg and O’hara, 2000;
Reader et al., 2011; Lefebvre et al., 2013), ecological niches
(Lefebvre, 2013), and personality attributes (Gardner, 1994a;
Miller, 2000).
Art in all of its manifestations (visual art, music, literature,
dance, theater, and more) is an important feature of human
societies because it serves as a cohesive symbolic communica-
tive system conveying cultural norms, history, ideas, emotions,
esthetics, and so on. Here, a dual perspective of brain and
creativity is adopted, namely the biological ancestry and the
neurological underpinnings in the human brain. (1) In examining
the biological aspects, animal innovations will be emphasized,
while the neurological underpinnings will be gleaned from (2)
consequences of brain damage as they apply to visual art produc-
tions (in artists, dementia patients, Parkinson’s patient, autistic
savants), and (3) relevant comparative neuroanatomy, functional
connectivity, intelligence, and neurotransmitters.
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CREATIVITY
Viewed from a biological perspective, the roots of creativity run
deep and are not necessarily limited to social or communicative
considerations. Rather, basic biological needs in animals such
as live-or-die (dire necessity), physical energy conservation, and
survival through deception might be the primary motivators for
innovation. Given adaptive evolutionary processes, it is reason-
able to assume that all of these have become interwoven into
the underlying brain mechanisms of creativity in humans. That
is, there is a deep survival motivation to communicate through
art when the communicative channel of language fails following
brain damage (discussed in subsequent subsections). In such
neurological cases, the turning to art is itself innovative; the
produced art, however, is not necessarily creative.
Changing the status quo practices through innovation is not
limited to humans. The classic example is that of blue tit birds
observed to steal milk from foil sealed milk bottles by punch-
ing through with their beaks (Fisher and Hinde, 1949; Hinde
and Fisher, 1951). In 1921 only a few birds restricted to a
small geographical radius near Southampton, England, lapped
up the cream in this way but within a few decades tens of
thousands of tits throughout Britain were observed. Whether or
not the initial motivation for the tits was fueled by curiosity, sheer
necessity (starvation), or patient observation of human behavior
is difficult to disentangle. In Japan, on the island of Koshima,
researchers observed a monkey spontaneously rinsing sand off
of her sweet potato in the river before eating it, something that
was viewed and adopted by the rest of her group (Kawamura,
1959; Kawai, 1965). The same monkey later innovated a method
for washing sand off of wheat grains by first dumping them
in water and then scooping them all clean from the surface.
Many more innovations in animals have been described (Reader
and Laland, 2003; van Schaik et al., 2006; Bouchard et al.,
2007; Laland and Reader, 2010; Benson-Amram and Holekamp,
2012).
Compared to humans, however, innovations by animals are by
far fewer (Laland and Reader, 2010). Nevertheless, some species
have been observed anecdotally to be creative and tested experi-
mentally (Reader and Laland, 2003; Laland and Reader, 2010); the
rate of innovations is particularly high in birds and non-human
primates (Lefebvre, 2013). Pigeons tested in the laboratory and in
the field innovated by solving a food-reaching problem and effec-
tively spread the new knowledge to other pigeons (Bouchard et al.,
2007). In the non-human primates category, chimpanzees and
orangutans are the most innovative, and among birds, it is ravens
and crows (Corvus); among those, New Caledonian crows are
considered to be exceptionally creative (Lefebvre, 2013). Although
our evolutionary pasts have diverged tens of millions years ago,
avians are part of our biological inheritance. With regards to
non-human primates, to whom we are closer genetically than
to avians, field observations documented numerous instances
in the context of deception rather than in innovative techno-
logical skills (Goodall, 1986; Byrne and Whiten, 1992). This
should not be surprising given development of social interaction,
interdependence, and tight hierarchy in primate groups where
survival depends heavily on cunning and flexibility (Byrne and
Whiten, 1992; Byrne, 2003; Byrne and Bates, 2010). Against this
background, creativity in humans can be viewed as an extension
of the fundamental biological survival functions of cunning and
deception.
However, not all non-human primates demonstrate the ability
to innovate (Byrne and Bates, 2010). A good example is that
of rhesus monkeys: Eating the flesh of coconuts is a preferred
food by rhesus monkeys living in the scientific refuge island of
Cayo Santiago, off of Puerto Rico. However, as Marc Hauser notes
(Hauser, 2003), in the 60 years that these monkeys have been
observed, despite watching coconuts fall off of trees naturally,
directly into man-made trash fires, where the hard shell bursts
open and the inside flesh becomes available for eating, no monkey
has purposefully thrown a coconut into the fires. Doing so would
have introduced an innovative way to optimize access to their
preferred food, the coconut flesh.
Large brain size strongly correlates with innovations in birds,
particularly with brain regions known as the hyperstriatum and
neostriatum, while in non-human primates the regions involve
the isocortex and the striatum (Lefebvre et al., 2004), roughly
equivalent to the cortical association areas in humans. These
human associations areas have grown in size several folds in the
human brain compared to other mammals and other primates
in the course of adaptive evolution (van Essen et al., 2012;
Buckner and Krienen, 2013). Meta-analytic studies in animals
have found that deviations from typical behavior that enhance
survival are associated with larger brains (Lefebvre et al., 2004),
although the brain’s size and its relationship to larger social
groups is a possibility, too, and a source of debate (Byrne
and Bates, 2010). Innovation in animals is strongly related to
tool use, learning, and abilities dealing with seasonal changes.
Some have argued that brain size evolution in birds is linked
to regions controlling behavior rather than by environmental
changes (Wyles et al., 1983; Reader and Laland, 2002; Laland
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et al., 2010). The significance of large brain size is the amount
of information it can store, the availability of axonal connectivity
to access concepts, and to cognitively manipulate them in cortical
regions.
Animals capable of innovations are driven by biological needs
to survive, and the same needs could have been passed on to
humans and are now entwined with other human-unique cre-
ativity capacities. Structural and functional brain comparisons to
animals shine light on some brain areas in humans that might
explain our high creativity rate. Specifically, the cortical associa-
tion areas and their equivalents in innovative birds are probably
important. Comparing the human brain to that of monkeys with
fMRI revealed several corresponding structural and functional
networks, but with two that are unique to humans (Mantini
et al., 2013), that is, the left hemisphere language network and
the left fronto-parietal network. Using MRI for brain structural
and parcellation analyses, investigators (van Essen et al., 2012)
have found larger left Sylvian Fissure, which includes the parietal
operculum, and in the medial temporal cortex, the portion with
the lingual gyrus and collateral sulcus (all critical in language
functions); in the right side the angular gyrus and dorsomedial
prefrontal region. Such asymmetries are not found in other
mammals, and could be playing a functional role in human
creativity.
NEUROLOGICAL UNDERPINNING: I. OBSERVATIONS OF
BRAIN-DAMAGE IN VISUAL ARTISTS
Neurological cases of visual artists who had practiced their craft
professionally prior to the brain damage can help point the
way to neuroanatomical and neurofunctional underpinnings of
creativity. Approximately 50 or so cases with unilateral brain
damage (largely in one side of the brain, and where the etiology
is commonly stroke or tumor) have by now been described in
the neurological literature (Rose, 2004; Bogousslavsky and Boller,
2005; Zaidel, 2005, 2013a,c; Finger et al., 2013; Mazzucchi et al.,
2013; Piechowski-Jozwiak and Bogousslavsky, 2013).
The key questions concern post-damage alterations in creativ-
ity, as well as loss of talent, or skill. A review of the majority
of these neurological cases suggests that, on the whole, they go
on producing art, sometimes prolifically, despite the damage’s
laterality or localization (Zaidel, 2005). Importantly, post-damage
output has revealed that their creativity does not increase, nor
diminish (Zaidel, 2005, 2010, 2013b). Given that the damage
arises unilaterally (only one or the other hemisphere), artistic
creativity in the healthy brain can not simply be attributed to a
single hemisphere, dedicated neural “regional center”, network,
or pathway, but rather to a diffusely represented capacity in the
brain. Indeed, it would further seem that creativity is highly
sensitive to brain damage, more so than artistic productivity,
talent, or skill.
We could speculate that in the healthy brain cognitive associa-
tive networks in the left hemisphere alone, in the right hemisphere
alone, or both hemispheres working together contribute to the
creative process in art. However, recent functional neuroimag-
ing evidence based on non-artistic behavior in healthy volun-
teers points to greater left hemisphere involvement in creativity
(Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). Where do the original ideas in
the artwork arise, is a complex question that researchers would
like understand (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Heilman and Acosta,
2013; Jung and Haier, 2013). The likely answer with regards to
the cerebral hemispheres is that both are functional in exceptional
creativity, but with each hemisphere contributing a different facet,
yet little understood, to the creativity process (Zaidel, 2013d).
Some of the artists develop techniques to compensate for
loss of basic sensory, perceptual, cognitive, and motoric abilities.
However, non-artists suffering from similar brain damage display
the same behavioral deficits in standard clinical tests and daily
life. Such artworks can be interpreted to display novelty, talent,
skill, and esthetics, and they have been so interpreted (e.g.,
Bogousslavsky, 2005; Drago et al., 2006; Thomas-Anterion et al.,
2010). However, another interpretation is that they are remnants
of previously well-practiced artistic skills, not expressions of cre-
ativity per se. The originality of their artworks is limited in scope
and breadth, and their imagination seems curtailed compared to
that of healthy artists.
One example is the loss of accurate depictions of 3-
dimensional objects with right parietal lobe damage (de Renzi,
1982). Hemi-neglect or hemi-inattention of the left half of space
is another example. Its manifestation is expressed in incomplete
painting or drawing of the left half of the canvas. In a majority of
the cases, however, neglect symptoms are short lived. The pres-
ence of the neglect syndrome has been attributed to imbalance
caused by the damage between intact and diseased tissue (Zaidel,
2005), as well as to an abnormal control of the healthy tissue in
the left hemisphere over the right half of space (i.e., the space that
is not neglected) (Kinsbourne, 1977). Since the same perceptual
deficits can be found in both artists and non-artists, they do not
inform us of art-specialized neural substrates.
We should wonder why remarkable creativity in the art itself
does not develop following brain damage, and why creativity
levels remain unchanged in those artists who have practiced art
prior to the damage. Compromised connectivity in the associative
knowledge and semantic networks is a plausible explanation. For
new ideas to originate the entire network of associations needs
to be in an intact state (see Figure 1). After all, the well-known
creative, influential, and important artists did not have brain
damage.
Interestingly, there are published reports of neurological cases
(due to stroke or head injury) of non-professional artists who
commenced to practice visual art only after the brain damage
occurred (Finkelstein et al., 1991; Lythgoe et al., 2005; Chatter-
jee, 2006; Pollak et al., 2007; Schott, 2012; Simis et al., 2013;
Midorikawa and Kawamura, 2014). What can we glean from these
de novo cases? One natural explanation is that the artistic behavior
is an alternative to loss of regular language communication capac-
ities, that is, speaking and writing. Art, too, is a communicative
system, but it does not appear to be as sensitive to brain damage
as language. Art conveys ideas, concepts, and emotions through
different means than language (and possibly through different
brain regions), and like language, it is a symbolic and referential
system. Drawing and painting simply expand the communica-
tion channels between patient and caretakers, thereby enhancing
survival and adaptation, much like the biological motivation to
innovate in animals in order to survive.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of artistic creativity in health
versus brain-damage (regardless of etiology). Artistic talent normally
interacts with the knowledge and semantic systems for maximal
expression of creativity. The left green arrow: the expression of creativity in
the healthy brain. The right broken red arrow: with brain damage the
knowledge and semantic systems are compromised and expressions of
creativity are curtailed (Discussion and details in the text).
However, published illustrations of such productions do not
bespeak of creativity (e.g., Pollak et al., 2007; Midorikawa and
Kawamura, 2014). Moreover, judging from the visual details
depicted by the artists and the quantity of works they pro-
duce, some researchers have argued that the art has a strong
obsessive-compulsive feature (Finkelstein et al., 1991; Lythgoe
et al., 2005; Chatterjee, 2006; Schott, 2012; Midorikawa and
Kawamura, 2014). One would have expected that the quantity
alone would foster experimentation and improvement, as is the
case with the prolific, culturally influential artists (Rembrandt,
Goya, Van Gogh, and so on). Instead, the overall profile suggests
that while brain damage does not hamper artistic expression, and
allows for talent and skill to be applied effectively, it does not
necessarily lead to creativity.
NEUROLOGICAL UNDERPINNING: II. EVIDENCE FROM
DEMENTIA AND DISINHIBITION
Importantly, visual artists with Alzheimer’s disease or fronto-
temporal dementia (FTD), and similar brain degenerative dis-
eases, continue to produce art well into their condition, with
no obvious reduction in artistic expressions (e.g., Miller et al.,
1998; Fornazzari, 2005; Crutch and Rossor, 2006). Their artistic
behavior ceases when severe motoric deficits profoundly curtail
their hand movements. The diffuse damage throughout the brain
involves large brain areas, and this makes it difficult to attribute
the artistic behavior to specific dedicated regions, pathways, or
networks (see Viskontas and Miller, 2013).
A few non-artist patients with degenerative brain diseases
commence to exhibit artistic behavior de novo following disease
onset (Miller et al., 1998; Mell et al., 2003; Miller and Hou,
2004; Chakravarty, 2011; Miller and Miller, 2013; Viskontas and
Miller, 2013). Interpretations have attributed the artistic behavior
itself to (1) diminished inhibition of expression due to degener-
ation of neural pathways that normally exert inhibitory control
over the cortex, i.e., frontal lobe fiber tracts running between
the prefrontal cortex and the temporal lobes; and (2) neural
degeneration in the left hemisphere “loosens control” over the
right hemisphere, when the degenerative process originates in
the left hemisphere. These interpretations assign critical roles
in artistic creativity to the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Miller and
Miller, 2013; Viskontas and Miller, 2013) as well as to the right
hemisphere in the healthy brain (Drago et al., 2006; Heilman and
Acosta, 2013). Alternative interpretations include (1) existence
of life-long latent (dormant) artistic talent; (2) loss of normal
language communication abilities (Zaidel, 2005). The latent artis-
tic talent explanation is highly plausible considering that only
a miniscule fraction of dementia patients exhibit spontaneous
artistic behavior following disease onset. If it were as simple as
loss of cortical inhibitory control, we would witness monumen-
tal artistic behavior corresponding to the number of dementia
patients.
With regards to creativity, as defined here, the dementia cases
exhibiting artistic behavior do not become more creative (Rankin
et al., 2007; Simis et al., 2013). Consistent with this observation
is a published report of 17 patients (non-artists) suffering from
a frontal variant of FTD who displayed poor and diminished
creativity (de Souza et al., 2010). Such findings and a recent
meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies (not measuring artistic
behavior) assign an important role to rostral and caudal portions
of the prefrontal cortex in creativity, in general (Gonen-Yaacovi
et al., 2013).
The frontal lobes have rich connections to the rest of the brain,
including regions critical for memory, concept formation, and
problem solving (Fuster, 2001). They exert inhibitory control on
behavior, and damage in the frontal lobes often results in behav-
ioral disinhibition, socially inappropriate behavior, and neglect
of hygiene and physical appearance (Teffer and Semendeferi,
2012). Can we generalize from these behaviors, which represent
deviations from accepted social norms, that patients with frontal
lobe damage are creative? A recent study suggests that they
become anything but creative (de Souza et al., 2010). However,
insights into the neural substrates of creativity might be gleaned
from decision-making research: Aron and associates (Aron et al.,
2007) have suggested that the prefrontal cortex and the basal-
ganglia network are involved in overcoming inhibitory neural
circuitries, particularly those that impose inhibition on impulsive
behavior. Fleming and associates (Fleming et al., 2010) support
the notion of the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia in status
quo rejection. By inference, then, the frontal lobes are involved
in some, but not all, aspects of the creative process in the healthy
brain.
NEUROLOGICAL UNDERPINNING: III. SPECIFIC
NEUROTRANSMITTERS
Parkinson’s disease (PD), characterized by tremors and motor
incoordination triggered by severe depletion of dopamine, is
commonly treated with dopaminergic medication. The effects
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of the disease and its medication on art is revealing about the
neural substrates of artistic production. Artists suffering from PD
continue to produce art, despite the tremor in their dominant
hand (Lakke, 1999). In both professional artists with PD and
de novo PD artists (i.e., produce art after disease onset), a link
has been found between dopaminergic medication and increased
rate of artistic output. The rate is attributed to strong obsessive-
compulsive components (Chatterjee et al., 2006; Kulisevsky et al.,
2009; Canesi et al., 2012). This is related to other issues hav-
ing to do with impulse control observed with the medication
(e.g., excessive gambling, shopping, eating) and is not restricted
to art production; it is a recognized side effect of dopamin-
ergic medication (Inzelberg, 2013; Weintraub and Nirenberg,
2013).
Walker et al. (2006) reported on enhanced rate of productiv-
ity in a case of a visual artist who with dopamine medication
increased his drawing and sketching activity. Similarly, Kulisevsky
et al. (2009) reported on an amateur PD artist in whom increased
medication led to higher rate of painting activity than previously
plus a change in personal artistic technique. Schwingenschuh et al.
(2010) described four successful artistic PD cases (a playwright, a
fiction writer, and two professional painters) who, after dopamin-
ergic treatment initiation, engaged in compulsive artistic output.
The common denominator in all of these cases was the presence
of pre-disease artistic talent; they were practicing artists. The
disease condition did not obliterate their talent or creativity (nor
increased it).
In addition, a link has been made between dopamine med-
ication and newly exhibited artistic behavior (de novo). Schrag
and Trimble (2001) described the interesting case of a PD patient
who began to write high-quality poems within the first month of
dopaminergic medication. Although he had not written poetry
previously, his grandfather on his mother’s side was an accom-
plished poet. His productivity went uninterrupted and eventually
he won an important poetry prize. However, only a fraction of PD
patients begin to exhibit art activity after dopamine treatment,
implying the treatment only releases manifestations of latent
talent, not creativity per se (see Canesi et al., 2012; Inzelberg, 2013;
Zaidel, 2013b).
The question remains, by what mechanisms dopamine acts
on artistic output? An interplay of the fronto-temporal lobes
and dopamine has been suggested by Flaherty (Flaherty, 2005).
Similarly, Schrag and Trimble (2001) suggest that the poetry
writing in their patient could have been due to the loss of
inhibition over art expression (because of frontal lobe dam-
age), as well as to the stimulation induced by dopamine
and serotonin. The idea is that normally, in the healthy
brain, an alteration in neurotransmitter balance together with
specific functional neuroanatomical regions can contribute
to artistic behavior. Obviously, artistic talent has to be in
place to begin with, or else no amount of disinhibition,
frontal lobe damage, or neurotransmitter imbalance would help
artistically.
It should be emphasized that dopamine is a neurotransmitter
involved in widely varied forms of human behaviors, including
sensations of pleasure, normal motor functions, impulse control,
drug addiction, concentration, gambling, and other functions
(Flaherty, 2005; Schultz, 2007). In particular, de Manzano and
associates (de Manzano et al., 2010) suggest that the D2 receptor
in the dopaminergic system, especially in the thalamus, plays an
important role in creativity in healthy individuals. The frontal
lobes play a major role in executive functions such as plan-
ning ahead, working memory, attention, and cognitive flexibility
(Teffer and Semendeferi, 2012). The thalamus is an important
relay station in the brain sending neural signals to the frontal
lobes and the rest of the brain. Although we do not yet know
the specific threshold for the effects of dopamine on creativity
in the healthy brain, density of D2 receptors could explain the
array of normal individual variability in creativity. Whether or
not levels of dopamine in conjunction with other neurotrans-
mitters, as well as intact functions of several brain regions con-
tribute to remarkable creativity needs to be addressed in future
research.
NEUROLOGICAL UNDERPINNING: IV. ARTISTIC TALENT AND
AUTISTIC ARTISTIC SAVANTS
Normally, artistic talent (inborn) and skill (can be taught) are
enmeshed with creativity (de Moor et al., 2013; Zaidel, 2013b).
Artistic talent ranges from an amateur to a professional, from
a dabbler to a prolific artisan. The creative process interacts
at each level of the talent continuum, providing other vari-
ables are in place, that is, we would expect increased cognitive
flexibility and wide mental associations at the higher ends of
the continuum. At the very minimum, remarkable artistic tal-
ent seems to be an inborn ability (de Moor et al., 2013), it
is relatively rare and does not follow a normal curve in the
population. Talented creative artists from the last few hundred
years alone seldom bring to mind their progeny (the Brueghel
family is a rare exception), and in such exceptional cases, chil-
dren mostly, not grandchildren. Although the environment and
culture play a role in the expression of artistic talent, the inborn
aspect is a major determinant in the first place (de Moor et al.,
2013).
What is the extent of interaction between talent and cre-
ativity? The special case of artistic autistic savants can provide
insight. Exceptional talent for drawing and realistic spatial depic-
tions is preserved in a tiny fraction of individuals with autism,
namely in visual artistic autistic savants (Mottron et al., 2009;
Treffert, 2009). The remarkable aspect of the condition is that
despite extensive neurofunctional dysfunction in the brain, the
neuroanatomic nature of which is little understood (Minshew
and Keller, 2010; Corrigan et al., 2012), islands of drawing and
painting talent are preserved. The nature of the displayed talent
consists of extreme attention to details and to repeated patterns
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). Although some cases are exceptionally
prolific, and by far more talented in their art then the majority
of people in the population, the evidence for creativity is weak
(Sacks, 1995, 2004; Nettlebank and Young, 1996; Pring et al.,
2012). However, some scholars report that they display improvi-
sations and variations on a theme and consider this as evidence
of creativity (Treffert, 2013). In any case, this constellation of
high skill with questionable creativity strongly suggests that in
the healthy brain creativity might be a separate process from
talent.
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BRAIN, INTELLIGENCE, AND CREATIVITY
Obviously, there is a sliding scale for what can be considered
creative. Some artists are exceptionally creative, some only mod-
erately so, and some only a little. The definition of creativity
perhaps should be modified to accommodate those that are not
exceptional in this regard. Broadening the definition by loosening
the conceptual boundaries of true creativity would include more
individuals. On the other hand, tightening the boundaries by
using the classic definition could enable researchers to arrive at
a better understanding of the neural processes.
The intriguing neurological question concerns the neural
events underway when creative thoughts that supersede the status
quo knowledge emerge. The temporal sequences in such events,
in particular, could help gain insight into the creative process
(see Sawyer, 2011). Importantly, these neural substrates in any
domain, art or otherwise, depend on activation of conceptual
associations in semantic networks, whether they are verbal or
non-verbal. These concepts represent knowledge and memory
of the world acquired throughout one’s life about specific facts,
skills, ideas, people, objects, actions, goals, cultural habits, and
many other categories (Patterson et al., 2007). Several such
networks with interconnected concepts function in the brain,
within the left and right hemispheres (Jefferies, 2012; Barbey
et al., 2013; Buckner and Krienen, 2013). Artistic skills improve
as a result of activation of these networks. Theoretical models
for how networks of connected concepts function have been
proposed (Marupaka et al., 2012). Activation of remote concep-
tual associations, the moving away from common, stereotypi-
cal, familiar patterns is a likely scenario in creative thoughts,
and healthy, intact, well-oiled connectivity (e.g., axons, myelin,
synapses, neurotransmitters) is at the heart of creativity’s neural
substrates.
What is missing from talented artistic autistic savants by way
of creativity? Studying the behavior and life-style of highly cre-
ative people in the arts and sciences, Howard Gardner (Gardner,
1994a,b) unraveled a pattern that they had in common. A mod-
erate intelligence level was one such factor (as well as risk taking,
ability to tolerate rejection, and more). Robert Sternberg (Stern-
berg, 1997; Sternberg and O’hara, 2000) included intelligence
level in the creativity process as well and considered it to be an
important contributing factor; he also listed motivation, knowl-
edge, personality, cognition, and the environment as important
factors. The implication is that the creative process in individuals
with low intelligence level is limited. If we consider the long-
term knowledge and semantic system described above, and that
this system has to be available for creative ideas to emerge, it
is reasonable that artistic autistic savants capacity for creativity
would be severely curtailed (see Figure 1).
CONCLUSIONS
The art produced by neurological patients reveals that when brain
damage is localized or diffuse, or when neurodegenerative brain
disease is present, or when there is savant autism, or Parkinson’s
disease, artistic depictions of the imagination are still possible.
Other functions such as cognition and language could show pro-
found impairments in the same patients. Both language and art
are communicative systems that rely on symbolic and referential
cognition, and yet, it is language that is more sensitive to brain
damage than art. Further, some of these neurological cases exhibit
artistic production capabilities not expressed previously (de novo
artists). The remarkable aspect is the artwork production per se.
The turning to art for communication is innovative. However, the
creativity status of the artworks is a matter for debate because
artistic skill (can be taught by others or can be self-taught),
together with inherent talent (an inborn ability, which may have
existed dormant all along) and esthetics, are all intertwined with
creativity and thus too complex to fractionate and measure.
What drives these patients to produce the art in the first place?
The answer might partially lie in our biological past. Animals
capable of innovations are driven by survival needs, and although
the creativity of humans is dependent on cognitive and semantic
networks as well as on social recognition, the same biological
need to survive might be part of the art production process.
This would express itself in the need to communicate after brain
damage impairs language abilities. While the need finds expres-
sion in producing the art, the creativity of the artwork requires
intact cognitive and semantic networks. Would these patients’
imagination have been different if no brain damage were present?
The answer would have to be in the affirmative. Professional
practicing artists who do not suffer from these conditions display
the kind of creativity that is socially influential for decades and
centuries.
Access to an intact knowledge and conceptual semantic
systems, healthy neural connectivity, and normal levels of neu-
rotransmitters such as dopamine, are likely essential for creativ-
ity. The fact that only humans produce art spontaneously, that
creativity is an important feature of art, and that humans are
more creative than animals, all suggest that additional clues to the
neural underpinnings of creativity lie in those features of the brain
that are unique to humans.
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